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Special Bodies 
Sergio Scarantino 
1. SURVNAL AND A LESSER CLAIM 
For already have I been 
a boy and a girl 
a branch and a bird 
and a dumb sea fish ... 
-Empedocles 
After I'm dead, when someone else in the world will be say-
ing "I am here," I won't be around to say that it's someone else 
who's saying this. Can I argue then that this "other" will not be 
other anymore and that it will be just "me"? Can I say that "I" will 
be? That I will be that, when this no longer exists? Can I deduce 
from this sort of word play that "I" exist so long as there are peo-
ple? That "I" am always alive? 
Venturing on this old, Schopenhauerian path,1 the problems 
that come to the mind of a modern traveller are of two sorts: those 
related to the issue of identity and survival, and those concerning 
the nature of the First Person, the "I." It is clear that, if the line of 
questioning mentioned above is not to be stopped in its tracks, 
one thing we need is a somewhat special sense for "I": for in an 
ordinary, everyday sense of the word, it is immediately obvious 
that after my death I, this physical person, the person who is writ-
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ing this paper, Sergio, will no longer be. Only when provided 
with such a second sense for "I" and having ascertained that 
what we have is a logically and semantically defensible tool, can 
we attempt to find whether there is any evidence to suggest that 
the persistence of this thing (whatever it may be) that is "I" can be 
assured under certain conditions. This second venture appears to 
be essentially an empirical endeavor to build a case for survival. 
The topic of survival has been extensively explored in con-
temporary literature. As to the meaning of "I," it is of course one 
that has engaged philosophers for centuries and remains one of 
the central issues in contemporary philosophy as well. I will make 
no attempt at considering even a summary of the formidable 
body of thought on these subjects. Rather, the purpose of this 
paper is to see whether, by combining some of the ideas put for-
ward in the contemporary analysis of the issues of survival and 
the First Person, some new sense can be made of the old riddles 
mentioned at the beginning. In particular, my intention is to see if 
a subjective mode can be built into the view of the "world-with-
out-me" (the world without the physical person that is me), tak-
ing the first step from one of the main tenets of the reductionist 
view of what we are defended by Derek Parfit2-namely, that 
what matters in survival is psychological connectedness. In the 
process, we will reach conclusions that I suspect go beyond what 
Parfit himself would be ready to grant. I hope to show that the 
metaphysical interpretation that these may suggest can be sub-
stantially (if not totally) discarded and that, in so doing, we may 
become aware of a metaphysical risk of a similar nature built into 
our ordinary beliefs about death. I realize that many of the topics 
discussed here would require a much more extensive treatment 
than the one that can be afforded in a short essay. I am confident, 
however, that I can convey at least a general idea of the moves 
involved in presenting the case. 
Until recently, the issue of survival has been linked unprob-
lematically to the criteria governing personal identity. In asking if 
I will survive until tomorrow, I ask if there will be a person living 
tomorrow and if that person will be me. The crucial answer 
seemed to rest on the criteria for assessing that two persons in 
two different times are one and the same person (the common-
sense criterion being bodily continuity). I believe that Parfit has 
proven quite conclusively that this is wrong. I subscribe to his 
view that what matters in survival is not personal identity but 
psychological connectedness with any cause (the normal cause 
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being continuity of the body, but the processes involved in imagi-
nary examples-like teletransportation, memory implants, etc.-
being equally good causes). I subscribe in particular to his diagno-
sis as to the metaphysical fallacy that lies at the root of the error 
in what he calls the "normal view": namely, that behind our con-
viction that the question "Will that person be me?" must have 
always a definite answer, there is the idea, more or less unsuspect-
ed, that what we really are involves a deep further fact (like a sepa-
rately existing entity) beyond bodily and psychological 
connectedness. 3 Once this deep further fact is removed, Parfit's 
arguments prove quite powerfully that survival is not governed 
by the logic of identity (one to one, all or nothing), but admits of 
degrees. It is thus a matter of mere convention and not an intrinsic 
empirical assessment to decide what amount of my body and 
related functions (in other words, what amount of my brain and 
my memory) is necessary to warrant the conclusion that a person 
tampered with by an imaginary surgeon with futuristic capabili-
ties is still me. In his treatment, psychological connectedness 
emerges as the only relevant criterion to assess if I survive either 
some science fiction occurrence or the ordinary molecular changes 
in my body from one day to the next. 
How does the conclusion that survival can be a gradual 
affair affect our view of death, where survival seems to be pre-
cluded by definition? What happens when there is no surgeon to 
transplant my brain into another body, no ready procedure to 
implant my memories elsewhere, no teletransportation, etc.? I 
think the reply is that death itself can be seen as the case at the 
end of a spectrum of possible modifications of me and not as a 
deep further fact-governed by an "all or nothing" logic-beyond 
the continuity of this body and its functions. This point and its 
implications will be clarified later. But, if it is not survival, we first 
have to state more precisely what type of case we want to build in 
order to make sense of our initial questions. 
I submit that, when faced with the prospect of our death, we 
may readily settle for a lesser claim: not one of surviving as what I 
know myself to be (Sergio), but one of living as a conscious being, 
with no other condition attached. What I mean is that, confronted 
with the prospect of annihilation, I realize that I am ready (and so, 
I suppose, would be many of us) to give up "much" of what con-
stitutes me. I can certainly give up my teeth, one hand, one leg 
and, with increasing reluctance, everything else that can be re-
placed with alternative material that can perform similar 
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functions. I can accept to live with half of my brain, if that sustains 
life. But I can also accept gradual replacement of more and more 
cells that make up my body and brain, as long as throughout the 
process there remains a living being. 
The question is: Where do I draw the line, in this progressive 
relinquishment of myself? I have learned from Parfit that there is 
no line to draw, no crucial cell whose replacement shifts ontologi-
cally the balance from "me" to "someone else." I know that all 
that is mere convention and, although I attach some importance 
to conventions, I am not inclined to attach to them fundamental 
importance in matters of life or death. I am therefore willing to 
give up Sergio, his personality, his memories, his physical fea-
tures. Briefly, I am ready to give up everything that constitutes 
this physical person and I suggest that so are you (after all, would 
you have a better alternative?) . More precisely, I am ready to give 
up everything provided that what I get at the end of the process 
of my demise is something that is alive: or, if a plant seems too lit-
tle, alive and thinking; or, if an animal also seems too little, a 
human being; or, if I get ambitious, a superior alien. For the sake 
of argument, let us pick a human being (you will have already 
suspected that the conclusion here is that all the possible options 
are "normally" and simultaneously offered). It is important to 
note that what I am ready to settle for is not mere being. A stone or 
a plant is. What I want to be is clearly more than that: I want to be 
a center of consciousness rooted in a physical person. Apart from 
that, any body and any mental life would do. 
We can now appreciate how much the perspective has been 
shifted with respect to survival. While what matters in survival is 
psychological connectedness, what matters in being a conscious 
being is just a brain and body. What is involved in living is the 
presence of a subject, not the continued existence of a given sub-
ject. As our continued existence in time does not require any 
"deep further fact" beyond psychological connectedness, our exis-
tence at this very moment does not imply any deep further fact 
beyond the existence of a functioning brain and body, carriers of 
psychological connectedness. Any brain or body. This brain and 
this body are necessary to being Sergio. But Sergio does not have 
a monopoly on existence as a conscious being. It should be clear 
then what my lesser claim in the face of death is. It is to be someone 
else: anybody, to be precise. This bears some resemblance to my 
birth. As Sergio is born with no memories of past lives, psycho-
logically connected only to himself (although genetically connect-
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ed to the entire human race), so would I be satisfied if I could be 
born again, as anybody. 
This raises an immediate difficulty concerning "I." Con-
trasting living with surviving makes sense only when referring to a 
given subject or subjects: it makes sense, in other words, if we 
compare a subject today with a subject in the past, but not in the 
future. Only in the first instance can we argue with Parfit that the 
decision between assessing if a subject of the past is surviving in a 
subject of today, or if the subject of today is simply the living of a 
different subject, is a conventional one. I can ask myself if my 
existence today is the survival of some person in the past and con-
clude with Parfit that, in some cases (if the body and brain of that 
person in the past were tampered with at some stage), the answer 
is a mere conventional one. But if I ask myself the same question 
with reference with some future person, how can my asking if I 
will be living be different from my asking if I will be surviving? 
And if we rule out survival, as we certainly would in a case in 
which there is no connectedness, how could the relevant future 
happenings concern me? It is clear then that if we want to make 
some sense of my lesser claim ("faced with the prospect of annihi-
lation, I would be ready to be someone else") what we need is a 
second sense for "I" as the subject of "to be someone else." While 
the "I" in the first part of the sentence is Sergio, this physical per-
son, the "I" in the second part, the "I" that is someone else, can no 
longer be Sergio, who has died (or faded away) in the process. 
2. THE FIRST PERSON 
The terrain on which we are now moving has become in-
creasingly the battleground of philosophical disputes between 
various forms of Cartesianism and various forms of anticartesian-
ism, and the struggle has been so fierce that, at least since Ryle 
wrote The Concept of Mind, it has become increasingly difficult to 
make substantial room for intermediate positions, namely for 
Kantian constructions. An attempt at giving even a sketch of the 
entire picture would go much beyond the scope of this paper. For 
the purpose of the argument I am developing, it is sufficient to 
stress that the debate is far from over and that these intermediate 
positions are in fact very much alive. 
I suggest that the best candidate for a second sense of "I" is 
to be found in the province of the "transcendental I" and that 
some of the objections it raises can be disposed of, once the con-
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cept is cleared of any Cartesian fallacy, by making it clear that 
what we are seeking is not a distinct account of what I am in 
terms of some sort of mental substance, but merely a coherent 
notion of a particular function of the mind, that is, a function of 
the brain (not only my mind and my brain, but yours too) and its 
referent. There are several examples in recent literature of con-
structions of this kind. I will refer in particular to the ones pro-
posed by Mackie, Nagel and Vendler, which I find heavily 
indebted to the Kantian tradition, even if they have been some-
times presented or criticized as Cartesianism more or less in dis-
guise.4 
Let us start with a line by Woody Allen: "My only regret is 
that I am not someone else." We all make sense of it, which means 
that we have some sort of notion, no matter how rudimentary, of 
what "I" means in this case. What notion is that? Clearly, if I make 
a similar regret mine, what I would be regretting is not that Sergio 
is not Sergio (which would be nonsense) but that "I" am not 
Sergio. I suggest that we borrow for the time being the definition, 
offered by Mackie,5 of this second "I" as the subject, whatever it may 
be, of these experiences. Mackie links explicitly this sense of "I" to 
what Zeno Vendler has called "feats of transference," although I 
think that the expression should be reformulated if it is to serve as 
a subject of a feat of transference, for the determinative "this" 
locks in, for reasons that will be made clear later on, the physical 
person who does the imagining. If I imagine to be Napoleon at 
Austerlitz, what I am imagining (no matter how imperfectly) is 
not that the physical person that is writing this paper, Sergio, 
travels through time and somehow borrows Napoleon's eyes to 
contemplate the battle. My fantasy is a different one: I imagine to 
be entirely Napoleon, with his personality, his body, his mind, his 
memories, his feelings and no trace of Sergio. I try to imagine 
what Napoleon felt at that time and how Austerlitz (or, for that 
matter, the world) must have been if seen through his eyes. It 
doesn't matter if I succeed only in part. The possibility of embark-
ing in a similar fantasy is a real one and is based on the realization 
that, no matter how different are the others from me, they are not 
too different. They have bodies that perform similar functions and 
minds that work in a similar fashion. To be Sergio is therefore, as 
Vendler puts it, to be in a possible "state" 6 and to imagine being 
Napoleon is to imagine to be in a different state. Who is in a dif-
ferent state? An empty "I," a mere "unity of consciousness," the 
Transcendental Self. Vendler stresses that this is not a thing, an 
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object in the world, for "it has no content and no essence; it is a 
mere frame in which any picture fits." 7 Equally, it is not a soul or 
any form of mental substance that serves to individuate me, but 
merely a function of the mind, that is a function of every normal 
human brain. To be more precise, if we assume that we are talking 
about self-consciousness in human beings, the function here 
involved is the perception of an objective order of things in which 
one particular thing-a functioning human body-is me. This is a 
rather complex performance that underlines a dual approach to 
reality and that provides the link with Nagel's view. To make 
clear why self-consciousness allows for a double rule of reference 
to "me," consider the following. 
3. A SPECIAL BODY 
There are many human bodies, all different but also all sub-
ject to the same rules of functioning. Different yet similar. Among 
them, one appears to be special. One is always present (it is the one 
I refer to when I say "I"). Its limbs are the vehicle for pain and 
pleasure, feeling and perception. Yet this special body is made of 
absolutely normal, ordinary ingredients (nerves, sensory organs, 
brain), which function neither better nor worse than do so many 
others. What accounts, then, for the difference? I seem to have 
nothing in my stock of knowledge, in anatomy as much as in neu-
rology-briefly, in my objective view of the world-that accounts 
for it. This difference does not find an objective explanation and 
yet I can test it, empirically, every moment. Certain physical fea-
tures, a certain personality and so forth account for Sergio. But 
those physical features or that personality cannot be the "special" 
element, for they have changed throughout the years. It is only 
the constant "presence" of that body, its nature as exclusive vehi-
cle of sensations, that makes it so. 
One can ask, to be sure: "Special" indeed, but for whom? 
Obviously, special for me. It is true that one always runs into this 
odd presence of a special body. But this special body is different 
for every subject. Therefore there is not one "truly" special body. 
There is only a special perception of the body on the part of that 
body itself. This is a valid response, but it is also one that opens 
the way for a double referent for "I." In the first place, it shows 
that the datum of specialness, which is an undeniable datum of 
subjective experience, is not "apparent" in the sense that it is illu-
sory or deceptive. Rather, it is a basic function of the mind of con-
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scious beings : the perception of oneself as an element in the 
world, carrier of that function. This function points to a subject, 
and therefore to an "I," that is clearly the physical person that 
finds itself special. But this, on the other hand, is something dif-
ferent from the "I" that finds that no physical person is special. 
This (second) "I" is the subject of a non-privileged view of the 
world that is mine and that I share with others. This interpersonal 
(and not non-personal) point of view on the world is, in my read-
ing of it, the same "View from Nowhere" (or the "Centerless 
View") that has led Nagel, in his book by the same title,8 to postu-
late a refinement of our objective conception of the world, with 
the inclusion of an "Objective Self" as his subject. Treating this as 
"I," I can speak consistently of how the world appears to be 
"given" (to me) without violating its objective nature, by which it 
is also "given" to everybody else. If I had been somebody else, the 
world would be "given" to me in a different way, the "me" here 
involved being the open referent of a function the mind that, in 
yielding this physical person, must also yield everybody else. This is 
the reason why I believe the notion of the "Objective Self" and the 
"Transcendental I" are closely related: both can be resolved in "I, 
this physical person," while remaining both something different 
since they can be equally resolved in everybody else. And this is 
something that everybody can relate to one's own experience. 
Before applying this concept to my lesser claim, we have now to 
test it against three objections I consider among the most impor-
tant moved against the very idea of a second sense for "I." They 
concern, respectively, the referential force of the concept, its abili-
ty to yield a unitary subject and its semantic congruence. 
4. SELF-REFERENCE 
In his analysis of self-reference, Gareth Evans has claimed 
that "our thoughts about ourselves are in no way hospitable to 
Cartesianism" 9 and has denied that in self-conscious thought one 
is thinking about oneself as the bearer of mental properties or as a 
mind (the source, in his view, of the false notion entertained by 
some that we are nothing but a mind). He argues not only that 
there is considerable evidence that we think of ourselves in other 
ways, but also that we could not possibly think of ourselves as 
bearers of mental properties, since this would not serve to identify 
us. The reason offered is, essentially, that in expressions like "the 
subject of this thought or these experiences" the demonstratives 
SERGIO $GARANT/NO 143 
in "this thought" or "these experiences" would not provide an 
adequate idea of the thoughts or experiences involved without an 
adequate conception of the person who is having the thoughts or 
the experiences. A subject could not, therefore, identify himself by 
reference to them. 
As I see it, the case is somewhat overstated. Evans is right in 
pointing out that the mere reference to mental properties is insuf-
ficient to identify the individual that I know myself to be. But we 
should not be forced to conclude that we cannot characterize our-
selves as bearers of mental properties and, in particular, of self-
consciousness, and therefore that we cannot think of ourselves in 
that way. I agree with Evans that we cannot form a notion of our-
selves without referring to a physical entity in the objective order 
of things. In fact, we could not have a notion of thought if not as 
thought of a person. But then, precisely because the notion of a 
person is built into the notion of thought, nothing prevents me 
from referring to myself as a thinker of thoughts. Evans intro-
duces, as a possible example of a subject that cannot have an ade-
quate idea of himself, the imaginary case of a human brain 
existing from birth in a vat and subjected by scientists to a series 
of hallucinations of a kind which would enable the brain to devel-
op normal cognitive faculties. If apprised of the facts, Evans 
claims, "he would have to abandon the Idea of himself as the 
occupant of a position in space" and "would have to attempt to 
think of himself as nowhere." 
I find here an interesting contradiction: How could the sub-
ject be apprised of the facts and therefore grasp that his world is not 
real without in fact retaining a notion of the world (the "real" one) 
and a notion of himself as a subject that is somewhere (even if in a 
world that he cannot see)? The contradiction is a revealing one, 
for the alleged impossibility to form an adequate notion of him-
self in this case seems to stem from the attribution of conscious 
thoughts (thoughts recognizable as such by the subject) into 
which no conception of "being the thoughts of a physical entity" 
has been built. Not only does this contradict the very assumptions 
of the example, but further evidence that this is wrong can be pro-
duced considering what I believe to be a proper case of a thinking 
subject who cannot form an idea of himself. 
Imagine a man that since birth is mute and paralyzed and is 
positioned in such a way that he cannot see his body. Imagine fur-
ther that all his physical needs are attended to through instru-
ments that he cannot see and that, although seeing and hearing 
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people in front of him and maybe witnessing their leading a nor-
mal life, he is totally ignored by them. I submit that such a person 
could in fact develop a rather elaborate (although obviously 
incomplete) view of the world he sees (perhaps just a room) and 
of the people in it and their relations, but he would not develop a 
notion of himself because he would have no opportunity (and no 
need) to form the concept that what he is experiencing is the expe-
rience of a physical entity located somewhere. He might form the 
notion that a certain area of the room (particularly if the room is 
very large) is somewhat special, for when people are there they 
can be seen more clearly and their words more clearly heard and 
their closeness might be more gratifying. He might thus develop 
the notion of a privileged space, but he would not form the notion 
that he is there and that he is hearing, seeing or feeling gratified. 
He might grasp the concept of "me" used by the people around 
him, but in so doing he would grasp only their referring to them-
selves and would not form a notion of self-reference as reference 
to himself. But he would not form an appropriate notion of thought 
either. Subject of thought and physical subject go together. For this 
reason, no account of the empirical genesis of the "I-thought" (the 
discovery that one is a person) can detract from the referential 
force of the concept "the subject of these thoughts" we can build 
on it. Once learned what I am, this a perfectly good 
way-although indirect, as pointed out by Mackie-of referring 
to myself. 
The same applies to experiences. In seeing a tree or hearing a 
beep and realizing that I am seeing it or hearing it, I am aware of 
the tree or the sound as much as I am aware that I am having the 
experience of it, and nothing prevents me from referring to it as 
"this" experience. In fact, we shift our perspective in this way 
(from the tree or the sound to the experience of myself seeing a 
tree or hearing a sound) whenever we call into question the abili-
ty of our senses to perform accurately (for instance, at an oculistic 
exam). Of course such reference as "the subject of this experience" 
does not give me any clue as to what individual physical being is 
having the experience. But what does that prove? It proves that 
the notion "the thinker of this thought" is dependent on different 
criteria for identifying myself 10 and is therefore insufficient, by 
itself, to locate me in the world as this specific individual (which 
was the ambition of the Cartesian Ego). However, since it places 
me in the world as somebody, somewhere, it is certainly not mean-
ingless. The expression has lost some of its referential force with 
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respect to this physical body, but it has not lost a referent: it refer s 
indirectly to me and directly to a particular function of my brain , 
self-consciousness, that is capable of grasping not only this body , 
but also itself . As such, this function is not a physical body, but it 
points to one that must be found: the physical body is both its 
object and its subject, for a physical body is built into the notion of 
thought (or experience). Being common to all human beings, such 
function is liable to yield every possible human subject. Sergi o 
realizes through this function that this function is rooted in thi s 
physical person, Sergio. But he also realizes that it is rooted in 
everybody else. Why call this function "I" and not mere con -
sciousness? For the simple (and metaphysically innocuous) rea-
son that, whatever it nets, in netting itself it nets something that I 
am. I am Sergio, but in being Sergio I am for me a special body, a 
"presence" in the world. 
In the light of the response given to Evans' concern for the 
referential force of the demonstratives here involved, the only 
amendment that I would propose to Mackie's formulation for the 
subject of a feat of transference is "the thinker of the present 
thoughts." This still contains a meaningful linkage with this phys -
ical individual, but one that is not as committed to his actua l 
thoughts and memory, for it locks in a whole category of possibl e 
subjects that are "present" in the world, and for each one of them 
it locks in himself. 
This is precisely the type of notion I use in thinking that the 
exercise of this function of self-consciousness, of which I am 
aware, could be netting at this very moment-and not because of a 
factual mistake of my senses in individuating my body-a differen t 
subject. That is, that I could have been (or could be) someone else. 
Only when we progressively give up "these" actual physical fea-
tures, as we do in my lesser claim, we must also give up "these 
(actual) thoughts ." This would leave us with a generic "thi nker of 
these (or present) thoughts" as open (some would say, erroneous -
ly in my view, as hollow) as "the thinker of thoughts" or, as Kant 
would say, "consciousness in general." 11 This would be a vastly 
incomplete account of Sergio, but it would still be an account of 
what matters in Sergio being me, since the "thinker of thoughts" 
points to a body that perceives itself as special. 
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5. UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS (ONLY ONE SUBJECT?) 
A further objection concerns the unity of the subject in "the 
thinker of this thought." As formulated by Elizabeth Anscombe in 
a famous essay, 12 the questions are: "What guarantees the same 
referent in different I-thoughts?" or "How do I know that I is not 
ten thinkers thinking in unison?" or again, in the words of P. F. 
Strawson, "How could the-or each-soul persuade itself of its 
uniqueness?" 13 Strawson's reference to "souls" shows that, once 
again, this seems to be, as Anscombe puts it, an "intolerable diffi-
culty" for Cartesianism, but not for the "Transcendental I." 
Various excellent replies have been offered 14 and I have nothing 
substantial to add to them. 
It is worth, however, stressing a point that appears as an 
underlying motive. The need to identify a distinct and unitary 
subject arises at the level of identification of a physical body. The 
Cartesian conception tries to locate an individual entity that is 
exclusively me through thought alone and therefore needs to 
build a unity of thought, severed from criteria of reference to a 
body, that it fails to find. But at the level of experiences, the con-
cern for unity is not justified. Once aware that I am a physical 
being capable of thoughts, I do not need to further identify my 
thoughts (in order to identify me) as if they were objects in the 
objective order of things, simply because they are not objects. It is 
their author who is one. I do not need to distinguish my 'bundle 
of experiences' from other bundles to identify me, because I use 
other criteria to identify me. The question of what physical thing I 
actually am may well remain open: I could be the sum of many 
things (in fact, I am the sum of many cells), I could be spatially 
scattered, I could be two brains linked together or the subject of 
other imaginary example, I could even be ten thinkers (bodies) 
thinking in unison: but, in any case, whatever I am, I am the total-
ity of the things I am and experience the totality of the experi-
ences I have. I have no problem of unifying the experiences that I 
have because I don't have to make them mine (as distinct from oth-
ers). There is nothing in addition to the totality of these experi-
ences which is their being mine: all are mine because all are 
experienced. 15 
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6. FEATS OF TRANSFERENCE: THE IMAGINED SELF 
The third and last objection that I intend to discuss here is 
the "classical" attack against the legitimacy of a second sense for 
"I" as arising from feats of the imagination, moved by Bernard 
Williams in an influential essay on the subject. 16 Williams con-
cedes that "I might have been somebody else" is a very primitive 
and very real thought and that it "tends to carry with it an idea 
that one knows what it would be like for this 'I' to look out on a 
different world, from a different body, and still be the same 'I'." If 
we press this hard enough, he says, we readily get the idea that it 
is not necessary to being me that I should have any of the individ-
uating properties that I do have, this body, these memories, etc., 
so that the limiting state of this progressive relinquishment of my 
features is "the Cartesian center of consciousness: an 'I' without 
body, past, or character." Williams focuses on how this attenuated 
form of "I" works in another speculation-that I might not have 
existed-claiming that "this we certainly want to agree to: few 
will be persuaded that their own existence is a necessary feature 
of the universe." The subject of "I might not have existed," goes 
the argument, must be the same attenuated "I" of "I might have 
been somebody else." The reason is that, if it referred to this phys-
ical person, it would not be an adequate account of what I want to 
express: for if nobody had existed with the properties that I actu-
ally have I could still have existed, in the line of the previous 
speculation, as someone else. But if this is so and the "I" of "I 
might not have existed" is the Cartesian center of consciousness, 
it is impossible to see what "I might not have existed" can possi-
bly mean, since it now looks "as though there is absolutely noth-
ing left to distinguish any Cartesian 'I' from any other, and it is 
impossible to see any more what would be subtracted from the 
universe by the removal of me." The difficulty, according to 
Williams, works back to the original speculation. If I conceive that 
I might have been Napoleon, what could be the difference 
between the actual Napoleon and the imagined one? "All I have 
to take to him in the imagined world is a Cartesian center of con-
sciousness; and that, the real Napoleon had already." Nothing 
would change in the world and therefore it is impossible to see 
what "I might have been Napoleon" could possibly mean if there 
is nothing verifiable about it. 
I think there is a mistake here. Williams assumes that the 
attenuated "I" is the Cartesian center of consciousness and pro-
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ceeds accordingly, treating it as an attempt (bound to fail) to iden-
tify a separately existing entity that is me and exclusively me and 
that is made of thought and thought alone. But the "I" of the feat 
of transference is not necessarily the Cartesian center of con-
sciousness. In fact, it can (indeed, it must) be construed as the 
transcendental "I" and, from that standpoint, Williams's case fails 
to take stock of the fact that, as long as there is conscious life there 
is "me" (in the Kantian sense of a transcendental unity of apper-
ception) . To go back to the initial step of his argument, the admis-
sion that he wants to extort from us (that I am not a necessary 
feature of the universe) is conditional on acknowledging the pos-
sibility that there might be no conscious life in the universe. The 
same applies when Williams claims that, approaching the same 
point from the opposite end, we might admit that someone could 
exist with just those empirical properties that I as a matter of fact 
have and yet that person not be me. Again, from the standpoint of 
the Transcendental "I," this speculation is not compatible with my 
non-existence, but it can only be made assuming that "I" am 
someone else, in which case "I" would still exist. Then, while it is 
certainly true that there is nothing to distinguish any Cartesian 
center of consciousness from another, it cannot follow from this 
that it is impossible to see what would be subtracted from the uni-
verse by the removal of the attenuated "I" (the Transcendental 
"I"). What would be subtracted would be all conscious life. This is 
a perfectly intelligible hypothesis and a sadly plausible one. In 
turning to the second part of the argument, to find out what "I 
could have been someone else" means, a science-fiction example 
might help. 
7. SWITCHING SELVES 
In the year 3001 a device for totally interchanging the Self was 
developed. Finally human beings were able to satisfy one of their deepest 
dreams: to find out what it is like to be someone else. What one feels to 
have not one's own mind, but someone else's. In the past there had been 
various brain transplants from one person to another, which had elicited 
more than a few polemics-moral, legal, religious. Now, however, the 
leap was far more radical. It was not a matter of inserting the memory of 
one body into another body, but rather of experiencing totally and with-
out any alteration someone else's being through his own mind, without 
making any change in it. It became possible, if only for a few minutes, to 
totally transfer the Self of one body into that of another and then trans-
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fer each of them back again into the original owners, without lasting 
modifications. The transfer was, as said, total but also completely harm-
less, inasmuch as the personality of the two individuals did not go 
through any alterations through the experiment. To assure the purity of 
the transfer, the memories of both individuals were not altered. 
When the experiment finally occurred, the result was, to say the 
least, disappointing. It so happened, in fact, that the subjects couldn't 
register the fact that the transfer had actually taken place. They simply 
remained the same. Since the personality of each one, their respective 
individual memories, their minds, remained unchanged, there wasn't 
even a way to ascertain that the experiment had been successful. Since 
no one knew how to correct this one flaw, the idea was soon shelved ... 
What exactly is the moral of this story? One consequence 
seems easy to draw. The experiment could take place today and 
we would not be aware of it. If God were playing this game and, 
let's say, I were you now, or you meanwhile had become him, 
how would we be able to know it? What difference would it make 
that the concerned individual may grasp? None, quite obviously. 
It wouldn't make any difference because it is the very notion of 
such an experiment that is senseless: one cannot understand, in 
fact, what would be "transferred" from one mind to the other 
when the mind (or rather the functioning body) is all that exists of 
a subject (it is the Subject itself), without any remainders able to 
travel off. But this is different from saying that being this person 
or another would not make any difference for me. As a matter of 
fact, it would make a great difference. But nothing would be 
transferred from one individual to the other, for every individual is 
his own Self. Rather, the situation is like looking at the same scene 
(the world) from different holes in a fence (human beings). One 
can move from one hole to the other and change his perspective 
accordingly, but the view from each hole (the Self of every indi-
vidual) remains the same. What is "moved" is not the Self, which 
is mere self-reference of each subject, 17 but the possibility of a par-
ticular subject being me. We already know that this does not add 
anything to the subject itself. What changes is my rooting in the 
world, or, to borrow an expression used by Evans in connection 
with an observation made by Nagel, the "immediate environ-
ment" of the subject. Nagel had written: 
I can conceive impersonally my house burning down, and the indi-
vidual T. N. standing before it, feeling hot and miserable, and look-
ing hot and miserable to bystanders. . . . If I add to all the premise 
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that I am T. N., I will imagine feeling hot and miserable, seeing the 
sympathetic bystanders, etc.; but this is not to imagine anything 
happening differently. 18 
Evans, resisting the suggestion that this might show that we 
do not know what to make of the identity-proposition I = T. N., 
has argued (correctly, in my view) that such identity-proposition 
need not make any difference to how the spatio-temporal map of 
the world is conceived, but it will make a great difference to how 
the subject's immediate environment is conceived. In claiming 
that we don't know what is for this identity to be true, Nagel was 
looking, according to Evans, for the impact in the wrong place. 19 
Let's return now to the second part of Williams' s argument 
and see what "I could have been someone else" means. It means 
that, in netting myself, the function of self-consciousness would 
net a different physical body. If "I" is a frame in which every pic-
ture fits, it means that the frame would contain in this case a dif-
ferent picture. This is not something that would be verified 
empirically, for the reasons discussed before. It would make no 
difference in the world as conceived objectively (just as the fact 
that I am Sergio does not make an objective difference in the 
world), but it would make a great difference to how my place in 
the world would be conceived. I can express this by saying that it 
would make a difference for the thinker of the present thoughts, 
for he would be no longer this physical person. The sentence "I 
could have been someone else" expresses therefore something 
that everybody can understand (for it evokes a possibility that 
everybody can imagine for himself). It would be a possibility sim-
ilar to "here could be a different place," which would be tanta-
mount to saying "we could be somewhere else" or "the present 
could be different," which would be tantamount to saying "we 
could be living in a different time." 
8. DEATH A FURTHER FACT? 
The concept of "Transcendental I" is the key to making sense 
of my lesser claim. This is the subject who can be someone else, 
the subject who is left after I have given up all the physical fea-
tures of Sergio, the subject of my ultimate concern. 20 So far, we 
have proven only that being someone else is a logically coherent 
hypothesis. But is it also a factual possibility? 
Does this "I" survive my death? It is obvious that it does, as 
long as there are conscious living beings, because every conscious 
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being has all that is required to be "me" in the sense of the 
"Transcendental I," and my actually being one or another future 
person would add nothing that they don't already have. Can my 
lesser claim therefore be granted? The answer is that ordinarily it 
is granted. The only empirical requirement is a body and a brain, 
and all that is required for that is the continued existence of a uni-
verse capable of producing conscious life forms. 
Many of us may regard this as an utterly irrelevant conclu-
sion, since it leaves us in the end with a subject totally unconnect-
ed with me. How could that be of any interest to me? 21 Others 
may feel that the conclusion that as long as there is anyone there 
is me is simply preposterous. To me, both are largely understand-
able but neither rests on solid grounds. Starting with the first 
reaction, I think there should be ample evidence by now that 
what emerges from my lesser claim still concerns me in a relevant 
sense: what is lost in death is something that I am ultimately will-
ing to give up, but what I value most, the possibility of being in 
the world somehow and somewhere and the possibility of being 
born as Sergio was born, is not something that is there to be lost. 
This should prompt us to take a closer look at our ordinary con-
cept of death. 
To make this clear, reconsider now the "combined spectrum" 
suggested by Parfit. 22 This consists, as is well known, of a range of 
possible cases of combination of the cells that make up the bodies 
of two individuals, say of Sergio and Greta Scacchi, the actress. At 
the near end of the spectrum there is a person psychologically and 
physically continuous with Sergio as he is now, a person that I 
would not hesitate to call "me." At the far end, there is a person 
psychologically and physically continuous with Greta Scacchi, 
that is, a person that we would call unproblematically Greta 
Scacchi. In the middle, there are all the possible combinations of 
the two persons, with the switching of only a few (or one) cell to 
distinguish one case from the next. Assuming that in every case 
the cells that are not used are destroyed, my death is identical 
with the opposite case at the far end of the spectrum, with Nature 
being the surgeon that destroys my functioning body and that, 
out of organic matter, creates a person totally unconnected with 
me. Parfit used the spectrum to argue that the cases in the middle 
show that there is not always a difference between some future 
person's being me and his or her being someone else. What we 
assume to be a deep difference (deep as the difference between 
life and death) between two cases is just a stipulation. Of the far 
DIFFERENT/A 152 
end of the spectrum, Parfit says that "it could not be clearer that, 
in this case, the resulting person would not be me." But, it seems 
to me, if the cases in the middle of the spectrum must be assessed 
by a stipulation, so must be, by the same token, the cases at the 
two extremities: there is no case where the assessment becomes 
suddenly an intrinsically empirical one. If we draw a sharp line 
anywhere along the combined spectrum, we cannot believe that it 
has an intrinsically rational significance because the line would 
fall between two neighboring cases separated only by the trivial 
difference of a few cells. By the same argument, then, there must 
be another possible description of the two cases at the two extremi-
ties of the spectrum, one that is ruled out by a stipulation and not 
because it is intrinsically wrong. The stipulation must be the same 
in all cases: roughly, that we call "someone else" somebody that is 
"much" unconnected with us. The possible description that is 
ruled out by this is, then, that Greta Scacchi is a completely modi-
fied version of me. This brings out clearly that what is assumed to 
be an intrinsic difference is just the strong holding of a stipulation 
and that the intrinsic element is just a metaphysical bias as to the 
deep further fact involved in being me. In thinking about death, 
we can equally well think of a passage "all the way" between the 
two extremities of the spectrum, of the disappearance of a person 
into another. This, as I see it, would be a proper reading of Parfit' s 
own comments on how to regard "my death," in Reasons and 
Persons: 
after my death, there will be no one living who will be me. I can now 
redescribe this fact. Though there will later be many experiences, 
none of these experiences will be connected to my present experi-
ences by chains of such direct connections as those involved in expe-
rience-memory, or in the carrying out of an earlier intention. (281) 
It is clear, then, that redescribing death as a case of transfor-
mation along a spectrum, with nothing but conventions ruling it, 
we can see that in our ordinary concept there is a dichotomy that 
should not be there. When we face the loss of someone, we mourn 
the loss of that physical person, of its personality, of its physical 
and psychological features. But when facing the prospect of our 
own death we do not simply fear the loss of this individual, 
whose features we are more or less attached and totally accus-
tomed to: we fear the loss of everything, of the world, since the 
world appears to be exclusively "given" to each of us through 
"this" particular person that we all call "myself." 
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Isn't there a metaphysical fallacy in this? I think there is and 
the consideration of the combined spectrum shows that it has to 
do with the idea that my existence cannot be a stipulation (and 
therefore cannot be a gradual affair or "a matter of content"), 
because I am some sort of absolute entity (a deep further fact) 
beyond this body and its continuity. We have already seen that 
this is wrong. Precisely, the mistake is to think that the fact that 
the world is "given" through this person is some sort of absolute 
truth, that this physical person is the sole proprietor of a special 
quality of "delivering the world." We should, on the contrary, 
consider that the world is equally "given" each time there is a 
conscious person around. Death itself is not a deep further fact 
(the loss of the world would be precisely that) beyond the end of 
this body and these memories. 
9. OUST TO DUST 
Those who do not believe that some life in the Beyond has 
been revealed, and do not imagine they will transmigrate after 
death to a world of souls, where rewards and punishments are 
meted out to revived bodies or to souls that are nonetheless simu-
lacra of those bodies, generally believe that death is the "end of 
everything." A similar belief is expressed, in biblical terms, by 
phrases like "dust to dust." As it turns out, the reference to dust is 
more accurate. But the idea remains, powerfully, that of nothing-
ness. Is it rational to fear this total loss, or is there also, in the ordi-
nary view, a deep further fact to be removed? We have already 
answered. The idea of my death as the "end of everything" sug-
gests a sort of "state": eternal sleep, the dark, the eternal void of 
non-being, of not-being-there. The "subjective" quality of this 
image (the implication of a subjective state of death) is precisely 
what is wrong with it: the fallacy is in placing a subject (a special 
body) in a situation when there is no room for one. To put it in 
other terms, there is no center of consciousness of a "death state" 
and no feelings to define an experience of ''being dead" as opposed 
to "being alive." (Equally, being alive is not an experience: it is a 
prerequisite of experience.) Another way to put the ordinary view 
is "From nothing we came and to nothing we shall return." Let us 
see in what sense this is plausible. It would not be so if we 
claimed to be ignorant of our origin in the world. On the contrary, 
we know what materials we are made of. But we also know that 
these materials were here before we were: except that they were 
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not assembled in the specific way they are "Us." The materials of 
which the machine I am writing with is composed existed before 
this "unity" of theirs existed, this combination of theirs that is, 
precisely, the machine. Over time they underwent innumerable 
transformations, yet there is nothing mysterious in the origin of 
the machine. We can say of ourselves, then, as we say of the 
machine, that before a certain time we did not exist, that there 
were no parts of our unity (of the unity that we are), without our 
thereby conjuring up, for this very reason, mysterious origins. 
This is the sense, ordinary and harmless as it is, in which I 
think the sentence "From nothing we come, and to nothing we 
shall return" is true: being a certain composition of matter, of the 
biblical "dust," a certain phase in the flux of the transformation of 
matter, we exist for a limited time. Before and after that time, 
there is nothing of that composition of matter that I am. But this is 
not to say that there is the "Nothing," in the sense of a definite 
metaphysical entity (since there is still the world), but rather that 
there is none of the consciousness that I am. But if it is true in this 
sense that we come from nothing, it is equally true, by the same 
token, that nothing is required for "coming," in the form of any 
body whatsoever that perceives itself as special, that is, in the 
form of a Subject, given the existence of the world (given the 
dust). The idea of "nothingness" as a sort of place where we go 
when we die is just a misleading metaphor. But if we choose to 
insist on the language of metaphor and myth, nothingness cannot 
be only that toward which one goes, but something out of which 
one comes. Something out of which we, who have the evidence of 
birth to life, have come. 
What of Sergio is destined to die? Everything, obviously. My 
mind is a function of this body and, when the function ceases, 
nothing of it remains. But insofar as it is matter ("dust") and part 
of the world, something remains of that which has made me that 
death cannot take away from the world: and this is the possibility 
of an "act of birth," the principle by which one is born. Precisely 
because I, ordinary thing that I am, come from dust, this dust is 
sufficient to manifest an ordinary thing. After Sergio's death, 
there will still be all the ingredients by which life and subjectivity 
are given in the world, and through which one says "I" and lives 
that "I." There will not be these ingredients, but ingredients there 
will be. I need hardly to stress that I am not speaking here of rein-
carnation, since there is nothing to be incarnated or reincarnated, 
nothing that may "transmigrate." The process is rather the 
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reverse. It is the matter that is animated, that is organized and 
becomes memory, consciousness, individuality, thought. We are 
not in a house of souls waiting to be called upon to inhabit a body . 
Matter turns into us and calls itself "I." This is "my" origin, and 
this "my" future. I am matter. There is nothing more; but there is 
also nothing less . I am not the spirit who is the "owner" of this 
body, but I am this dust which has in itself the property of being 
flesh and "spirit." In death we do not take the world with us, but 
only a particular view of the world. We partake of a change of 
forms, of the transformation of matter . We remain here. Not like 
Lazarus, called up from the tomb to be himself once more: but 
rather, like a plant-bud, or an animal, or a baby, that is new every time. 
I still owe a response to those who find all this preposterous. 
I think that, inasmuch as it plays a role here, the impression that 
the notion of Greta Scacchi being a modified version of me is 
absurd, this can be lessened on reflection that both Greta Scacchi 
and I are, after all, both human beings. But there is a better 
response. Nagel has written, commenting on Parfit's claim that 
we can choose what type of beings to think of ourselves as, that 
there must be some objective limits to the freedom to reconstrue 
oneself, or it will become hollow. I can't defeat death by identifying 
myself as "Proteus Nagel," the being who survives if anyone sur-
vives.23 
In fact, there is such a limit. But we should be clear as to 
what its nature is. I don't think for a moment that we can stipulate 
anybody into existence. But we can stipulate if a future existing 
person is me. Parfit's combined spectrum proves that there is no 
ontological impossibility in calling "me" what emerges if my lesser 
claim is granted. The degree of tolerance for the stretching of con-
ventional satisfaction in defining "me" depends then entirely on 
what we are attached to in "me" and not on what we consider 
ourselves to be, since this second is the result and not the cause of 
the stipulation. If I place all that I value in Sergio, I am not inter-
ested in the lesser claim. The loss of this individual will be the 
loss of everything that matters, and the loss of my world will be 
psychologically equivalent to the loss of the world pure and sim-
ple. I would then describe my story saying that: 
a) an entire universe has been necessary to make this small 
thing that I am appear once briefly on earth and there is 
nothing more to it. 
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If, on the contrary, while being attached and totally accus-
tomed to Sergio, his memories, his body and his view of the 
world, what I ultimately value is to be in the world and enjoy a 
mental life-and not necessarily the mental life, the memories and 
the body of Sergio-then what my lesser claim has to offer is sig-
nificant for me. I would then describe my story saying that: 
b) Sergio is only one of the innumerable ways in which one 
can be in the world, and there is more to it than just being 
Sergio. 
From this second standpoint, being in the world is incessant-
ly given and death is only a rhythm of a flux, the end of a certain 
train of thoughts and the beginning of another, unconnected one. 
I do find in this prospect an unsettling element. It joins us, much 
more intimately than we would like, perhaps, to the fate of all liv-
ing beings, including those we consider inferior ones, in a uni-
verse that does not always deal charitably with its creatures. But, 
at the same time, I feel like Parfit some consolation, for, in taking 
this path, I become convinced that, even when Sergio no longer 
exists, I, which will then be something different but no less real, 
shall continue to partake-in a way that Sergio does not know 
and never will know, although it is there right before his eyes-in 
this awesome festival of life. 
It is clear then that we have two ways to go: either we take 
the lesser claim or we do not. But the choice has to rest on our 
attitude and values rather than on our ability to settle the issue on 
empirical or logical grounds. Recognizing this, a rigorously neu-
tral approach would thus perhaps require that the reply to the 
question "What should I think of what comes after my death?" be 
that I should think nothing about it. Considering, however, how 
strong is my urge to think something of it, for its direct bearing on 
how I regard my life, such a conclusion strikes me as a profound 
and somewhat startling departure from our ordinary views and 
dispositions. To decide how to regard our death and its aftermath, 
one way or the other, remains a powerful motive in our thinking, 
emotionally and existentially inescapable. If the considerations 
made so far have injected a doubt that our convictions might rest, 
ontologically, on hollow grounds, the purpose of this paper has 
largely been attained. 
Those who do not think that the world around them is ulti-
mately rooted in mystery will not find it particularly perplexing 
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that they are alive in the world now. By contrast, those who feel 
that there is a mystery here and measure their thoughts against it 
seem destined to this non-conclusion: that this sort of enigma 
might be something that cannot be resolved but something that 
must be lived. 
New York, February 1991 
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